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Complex systems—such as gas turbines, industrial plants, and infrastructure networks—
are of paramount importance to modern societies. However, these systems are subject to
various threats. Novel research does not only focus on monitoring and improving the
robustness and reliability of systems but also focus on their recovery from adverse events.
The concept of resilience encompasses these developments. Appropriate quantitative
measures of resilience can support decision-makers seeking to improve or to design com-
plex systems. In this paper, we develop comprehensive and widely adaptable instruments
for resilience-based decision-making. Integrating an appropriate resilience metric
together with a suitable systemic risk measure, we design numerically efficient tools aid-
ing decision-makers in balancing different resilience-enhancing investments. The
approach allows for a direct comparison between failure prevention arrangements and
recovery improvement procedures, leading to optimal tradeoffs with respect to the resil-
ience of a system. In addition, the method is capable of dealing with the monetary aspects
involved in the decision-making process. Finally, a grid search algorithm for systemic
risk measures significantly reduces the computational effort. In order to demonstrate its
wide applicability, the suggested decision-making procedure is applied to a functional
model of a multistage axial compressor, and to the U-Bahn and S-Bahn system of
Germany’s capital Berlin. [DOI: 10.1115/1.4044907]
1 Introduction
Modern societies rely on the operations of various complex sys-
tems, such as gas turbines, industrial plants, or infrastructure net-
works. These form complex capital goods whose construction,
improvement, and regeneration are of paramount importance.
However, these systems are subject to various threats. Evidence
shows that a wide range of natural, technical, and anthropogenic
impacts at all scales can severely affect the functionality of these
systems. Due to their high and increasing complexity, it is infeasi-
ble to identify all potential adverse impacts and to prevent them
accordingly. Novel developments are therefore important that do
not only focus on monitoring and improving the robustness and
reliability of systems but also focus on their recovery from
adverse events [1]. The concept of resilience encompasses these
developments: analyzing and optimizing robustness, reliability,
and recovery of systems—both from a technical and from an eco-
nomic perspective [2–4]. Resilience applied to the artificial sys-
tems of our modern society leads to a paradigm shift. Secure
systems can not only be based on strategies that prevent failures
but must include strategies for the efficient recovery in cases of
failure.
The concept of resilience in the context of engineering applica-
tions has gained growing popularity in recent years [5,6]. The
term “resilience” appears in several different domains like ecol-
ogy, economy, psychology as well as in the context of mechanical
and infrastructure systems and is derived from the Latin word
“resilire” which means “to bounce back”. The concept of resil-
ience first appeared in the domain of ecological systems by
Holling [7]. He defined resilience as “[…] a measure of the
persistence of systems and their ability to absorb change and
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disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between pop-
ulations or state variables.” Although many different definitions
of resilience were introduced in the context of engineering and
complex systems (e.g., see Refs. [8–12]), the early definition from
Holling [7] captures key aspects of all of them.
Ayyub [13] provides a review of the literature and develops a
comprehensive definition of resilience in the context of complex
systems which is based on the content of the Presidential Policy
Directive (PPD) on critical infrastructure security and resilience
[14]: “Resilience notionally means the ability to prepare for and
adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly
from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and
recover from disturbances of the deliberate attack types, accidents,
or naturally occurring threats or incidents. The resilience of a sys-
tem’s function can be measured based on the persistence of a cor-
responding functional performance under uncertainty in the face
of disturbances.” This novel definition embraces the former defini-
tions and provides a solid basis for the quantification of resilience.
Our paper suggests a novel quantitative approach to resilience
enabling decision-makers to efficiently design and improve com-
plex systems present all over our modern communities [1,15].
Resources are not unlimited, and resiliences cannot arbitrarily be
improved in reality; realistic models must reflect constraints and
methods must be developed that support decision-makers in
choosing between different resilience-enhancing investments
[4,16].
This paper provides an efficient method for identifying the
cost-effective allocations of different resilience-enhancing invest-
ments by combining the resilience metric of Ouyang et al. [17]
and the systemic risk measure of Feinstein et al. [18]. A grid
search algorithm for systemic risk measures significantly reduces
the computational effort. In order to demonstrate its wide applic-
ability, the suggested decision-making procedure is applied to a
functional model of a multistage axial compressor, and to the U-
Bahn and S-Bahn system of Germany’s capital Berlin.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the theo-
retical foundations: the quantification of resilience, the systemic
risk measure and its adaptation to technical systems, and the grid
search algorithm. Section 3 develops on this basis a novel
resilience-based decision-making process. In Secs. 4 and 5, the
methods are, first, applied to a functional model of an axial com-
pressor and, second, to Berlin’s suburban train (S-Bahn) and sub-
way (U-Bahn) network. Section 6 summarizes the results and
discusses questions for future research.
2 Theoretical Fundamentals
2.1 Resilience Quantification. Applications of resilience to
engineering problems rely on the availability of quantitative
measures of resilience. Within the last two decades, various meth-
odologies have been developed. Comprehensive discussions of
different resilience metrics are provided by Bergstr€om et al. [5],
Hosseini et al. [15], and Linkov and Palma-Oliveira [19]. In addi-
tion, Hosseini et al. [15] propose a specific classification system
for these metrics. Most resilience metrics are performance based,
and the majority of performance-based measures of resilience are
assigned to the category of “generic resilience metrics.” These
determine resilience by comparing the performance of a system
before and after a disruptive event. Further subcategories are con-
structed by distinguishing between time-dependent or time-
independent and deterministic or probabilistic metrics,
respectively.
Performance-based approaches may be ratio based, integral
based, or both. When a system is exposed to a disruptive event
and recovers its functionality afterward, it passes through three
essential phases: (i) the original stable state whose duration can be
interpreted as the reliability of the system forms the first phase.
(ii) The second phase is the vulnerability of the system, repre-
sented by a loss of performance after the occurrence of a
disruptive event; the robustness of the system mitigates the loss of
performance. (iii) The disrupted state of the system and its recov-
ery to a new stable state represent the recoverability and the last
phase. The three phases are illustrated in Fig. 1, with Q(t) denot-
ing the system performance at time t. The new stable state may
differ from the original state, e.g., in terms of its performance
which may be higher or lower.
The majority of resilience metrics in the literature is based on
system performance, i.e., on these three states and their transi-
tions. A quantitative measure of resilience thus depends on the
specific choice and definition of system performance [3].
Bruneau et al. [21] propose a time-dependent metric of the
resilience of communities under seismic disruption in a determin-
istic setting. If t0 is the time of occurrence of a disruptive event, t1
the time of complete recovery, and Q(t) the quality of the commu-
nity infrastructure at time t, a specific type of system performance,





For systems with random performance, this metric defines a path-
wise measure of resilience. Bruneau et al. [21] also introduce the
well-known principle of a “resilience triangle” as illustrated in
Fig. 2. Their approach was applied in various contexts and forms
a strong basis for several, later proposed metrics [22–24]. Further
Fig. 1 In the evolution of a system after the impact of a disrup-
tive event, different phases can be distinguished: (i) the original
stable state; (ii) disruptive impact, vulnerability; and (iii) dis-
rupted state and recovery. These are separated by the following
points in time: to—beginning of the original stable state; te—
end of the original stable state due to the occurrence of a dis-
ruptive event; td—end of disruptive impact and beginning of
disrupted state; ts—end of disrupted state and beginning
of system recovery; tf—end of system recovery and beginning
of new stable state; adapted from Ref. [20].
Fig. 2 Resilience triangle; adapted from Ref. [21]
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resilience metrics in the context of deterministic models were,
e.g., suggested by Refs. [25–29].
Pathwise metrics do not rely on probabilities and do not capture
quantities that depend on probabilities—such as the rates of occur-
rences of disruptive events and the distributions or moments of
the random size of disruptions or the random times of their recov-
ery. Such quantities require the existence and knowledge of a
probability measure on the scenario space together with probabil-
istic resilience metrics, e.g., see Refs. [12] and [30–33]. Very
informative resilience metrics were introduced by Ouyang et al.
[17] and Ayyub [13]; both metrics are probabilistic, time depend-
ent, and universally applicable.
In this paper, we utilize the probabilistic resilience metric by
Ouyang et al. [17]. Denoted by Res, it is defined as the expectation
of the ratio of the integral of the system performance Q(t) over a
time interval [0,T] and the integral of the target system perform-
ance T QðtÞ during the same time interval:






T Q tð Þdt
(2)
System performance Q(t) is a stochastic process. The parameter
T QðtÞ is generally considered as a stochastic process as well, but
for simplicity it is assumed to be a nonrandom constant T Q in
this work.
Sometimes, it is useful to rewrite Eq. (2) in terms of a sum of
the impact areas of failure events. If t1; t2; t3;… is the sequence of
the consecutive occurrences of failures, the random number of
failures up to time T is NðTÞ ¼ supfn : tn  Tg. The impact area
AIAn is the expected area between the reduced system perform-
ance curve and the target system performance curve caused by the
nth failure within the considered time interval. Under the assump-
tion that the system fully recovers before its next failure, one
obtains that AIAn ¼ Eð
Ð tnþ1
tn
½T Q QðtÞdtÞ. In this case, Eq. (2)





T Q  T (3)
The resilience metric takes values between 0 and 1. The value
Res¼ 1 indicates a system performance corresponding to the tar-
get performance, while Res¼ 0 captures that the system is not
working during the considered time period.
2.2 Systemic Risk Measure. Feinstein et al. [18] propose a
novel approach to measure risk inherent in complex systems.
Their methodology is based on two key components: first, a suita-
ble descriptive input–output model; and, second, an acceptance
criterion representing the normative safety standards of a regula-
tory authority. These systemic risk measures were, e.g., consid-
ered in finance, see Weber and Weske [34], and applied to power
transmission, see Cassidy et al. [35].
Let ðX;F;PÞ be a probability space, l 2N the number of enti-
ties in the considered system, and k 2 Rl a vector of controls. For
each scenario x 2 X and a control vector k, we denote by YkðxÞ
the relevant stochastic outcome of the system; for each k 2 Rl, Yk
is a random variable.
In the context of financial systems, the vector k is the
“endowment” and describes the capital allocation to the entities of
the system. The underlying input–output model of the system is
given by Y ¼ ðYkÞk2Rl , a nondecreasing random field taking val-
ues in some vector space X of random variables. The monotonic-
ity property encodes that a larger capital allocation,
ki  mi 8 i ¼ 1;…; l, increases the random outcome, i.e.,
Yk  Ym. The acceptance criterion is described by the set A  X
of random variables meeting the requirements of a decision-
maker; for a survey on acceptance sets and monetary risk meas-
ures, we refer to F€ollmer and Weber [36].
The systemic risk measure constructed from these two basic
ingredients, the input–output model and the acceptance criterion,
is the set of allocations of additional capital leading to random
outputs that satisfy the acceptance criterion, i.e.,
RðY; kÞ ¼ fm 2 RljYkþm 2 Ag (4)
2.3 Adapted Systemic Risk Measure. The systemic risk
measure introduced in Sec. 2.2 can be applied to engineering sys-
tems with components of multiple types with several endowment
properties. We consider technical systems for which a meaningful
system performance Q(t) can be determined. It is assumed that the
system consists of l system components each characterized by
their type and n properties that influence the system performance.
For convenience, we replace the vector notation of Sec. 2.2 by
matrix notation.
Consider a component i 2 f1;…; lg. Such a component can be
characterized by a row vector
ðai; jiÞ ¼ ðgi1; gi2;…; gin; jiÞ 2 Rð1nÞ N (5)
where ðgi1; gi2;…; ginÞ are the numerical values of the n relevant
properties and ji 2 f1; 2;…; bg N is its type. Once all compo-
nents are specified, the system is described by a pair consisting of
a matrix A 2 RðlnÞ and a column vector z 2Nl that captures the
types of the components:

A; zÞ ¼
g11 g12 … g1n; z1
g21 g22 … g2n; z2
   





The input–output model Y ¼ ðYðA;zÞÞ is enumerated by these
pairs. In our case studies, we will typically assume that vector
z of types is fixed and investigate the impact of a varying
matrix A.
A corresponding systemic risk measure is now constructed as
follows. As a specific example, we choose the acceptance set
A ¼ fX 2 XjE½X  ag with a 2 ½0; 1 (7)
A corresponding risk measure is defined by
R Y; Kð Þ ¼ R Y; K; zð Þð Þ ¼ fA 2 RlnjYðKþA;zÞ 2 Ag (8)
which is the set of all allocations of modifications of the system
properties A such that the altered system characterized by (KþA;
z) possesses a resilience greater than or equal to a. In order to
keep the notation simple and without loss of generality, we set
K¼ 0, and R(Y;0) is written as R(Y).
For practical applications, it is often necessary to impose
restrictions on the structure of the matrix in Eq. (6). For example,
it might be required that any component of a specific type is con-
figured in the same way, meaning that the corresponding row vec-
tors ai must be equal. As described in Ref. [18], such constraints
can be captured by monotonously increasing functions gz : R
p !
RðlnÞ; a0 7!ðA; zÞ where z 2 Rl denotes the types of the compo-
nents; these functions map a lower-dimensional set of parameters
a0 2 Rp to the description of the system.
To illustrate this, we consider a system with l¼ 5 components
of b¼ 2 types. Each component is characterized by its two endow-
ment properties and its type, i.e., ðgi1; gi2; jiÞ, and we assume
that gi2 is a function of the type ji of the component i. More specif-
ically, we suppose that gi2¼ 3 for type 1 and gi2¼ 5 for type 2.
We choose p¼ 5 and consider as an example the types
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CCCCA ¼ ðA; z

(9)
In this example, the constraint reduces the dimension from
10¼ 5 2 to 5.
The dimension of the space of parameters can be further
reduced, if more constraints are introduced. Consider, e.g., the
additional condition that the first endowment property gi1 is a
function of the type of the components, but that it can
otherwise freely be chosen. This implies for the given types z ¼
ð1; 1; 1; 2; 2Þ> that q1 ¼ q2 ¼ q3 and q4¼ q5. In this case, p¼ 2
becomes the appropriate dimension of the parameter space.
2.4 Grid Search Algorithm. Set-valued systemic risk meas-
ures can be computed via a combination of a grid search algorithm
and stochastic simulation, see Ref. [18]. To employ this algorithm,
a box-shaped subset of endowments which are of interest is subdi-
vided by a grid of equally spaced points.
The grid search algorithm proceeds as follows. In a first step,
the search is started at the origin of the considered box; we assume
that the origin is outside of R(Y); from here, the acceptance crite-
rion is successively evaluated for each adjacent grid point,
lying on the diagonal of the grid identified by the direction
ð1; 1;…; 1Þ>. Each evaluation typically requires stochastic simu-
lation. The search along the diagonal direction is interrupted as
soon as a point satisfying the acceptance criterion is identified.
Due to the monotonicity of the input–output model and the prop-
erties of the acceptance criterion (cf., Ref. [18]), all grid points
representing superior endowments are acceptable as well and
belong to R(Y). Analogously, all endowments that are worse than
the first identified point are rejected, thus belonging to R(Y)c, the
complement of the systemic risk measurement. It is precisely this
monotonicity property that makes the algorithm efficient.
Each pair of diagonally adjacent points, one meeting the
requirements and the other not, defines a sub-box. The algorithm
checks the remaining corners of this sub-box and can quickly
assign an acceptance status to dominating, respectively, domi-
nated endowments. Subsequently, new pairs of points can be
determined, one in R(Y) and one outside. The successively result-
ing sub-boxes are checked in the same way as before. The algo-
rithm terminates when all points on the grid are assigned to an
acceptance status. It finally determines a discrete grid-
approximation of R(Y).
For a more detailed description of the grid search algorithm, we
refer to Ref. [18].
3 Resilience Decision-Making
The decision-making process for resilience-enhancing endow-
ments in complex systems, developed in this work, integrates
resilience metrics and systemic risk measures. As discussed in
Zuev et al. [37], complex systems are often described as networks:
nodes and edges represent systems as well as the connections
between their components. System components may be repre-
sented as network edges or nodes — whatever representation is
more appropriate.
In order to illustrate our method, we consider a specific flow
network as shown in Fig. 3. This network consists of seven nodes
and eight edges, as well as a source node denoted by s character-
ized by an initial flow w and a target node denoted by t with a
destination flow v, respectively. The network edges represent the
essential components of the network. Each component is assigned
to one of the two types, i.e., b¼ 2. We set n¼ 2, i.e., two endow-
ment properties are associated with each component: a capacity c
and a recovery improvement r*. Each component i 2 f1;…; 8g is
characterized by ðai; jiÞ ¼ ðci; r	i ; jiÞ 2 R
ð12Þ  f1; 2g.
System performance and resilience are analyzed for a time win-
dow [0,T]. The interval is partitioned into u parts by the time
points 0 ¼ t0 < … < tu1 < tu ¼ T. System performance Q(t) is
defined as a piecewise constant stochastic process that evaluates
the ratio of the destination flow and the initial flow at each time
point, i.e.,
Q tð Þ ¼ v thð Þ
w
with t 2 th; thþ1½ Þ (10)
We assume that partition is equidistant, i.e., Dt ¼ thþ1  th ¼
ðT=uÞ 8h. The specification of a notion of system performance is,
of course, not uniquely determined by the system; instead, alterna-
tive choices may be analyzed simultaneously and should thereby
be carefully selected to enable suitable resilience analysis for the
intended decision-making process.
The flow for a given endowment (A; z) is simulated as follows:
at each time point th, the flow of the entire network is computed as
follows. The flow starts at the source node and runs iteratively by
means of a node-by-node breadth-first search through the entire
network up to the destination node. Each node receives the partial
flows from all edges leading into it and returns them to all subse-
quent edges, obeying the following allocation rules: (i) the incom-
ing flow is allocated to all subsequent edges such that 30% runs
into edges of type 1 and 70% runs into edges of type 2. Among
subsequent edges of the same type, the relevant flow is uniformly
allocated; (ii) if the capacity of a subsequent edge is exceeded,
this edge is destroyed immediately and the flow is instead reallo-
cated to the remaining edges according to (i); (iii) if a node has no
subsequent edge, the flow emanating from this node is lost, i.e.,
the node becomes a sink.
After the flow has been computed at the time point th, the simu-
lation proceeds to time-step thþ1 ¼ th þ Dt: edges that have been
destroyed at time th are removed from the network in consecutive
Fig. 3 Example of a flow network with b 5 2 component types
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time-steps unless they are recovered; the process of recovery will
be described below. In addition, each edge can fail at random after
the flow has been computed at time th and before time thþ1. At
time thþ1, the algorithm (i)–(iii) described earlier is then applied
to the remaining network.
The failure probability of the edges in the time interval
ðth; thþ1Þ;
Pfcomponent i fails during ðth; thþ1Þg ¼ Dt  ki thð Þ (11)
depends on the utilization of the maximum edge capacity caused
by the flow; letting viðthÞ be the current flow of the edge i, ci its
capacity, and b > 0 a mitigation factor, we set




As discussed by Ayyub [13], multiple causes and processes can
lead to failures. In this illustrative example and in applications in
later sections, we consider only immediate failures due to over-
load or random impacts; failure might also occur due to a loss of
performance in time, e.g., by aging.
After failure, each destroyed edge is assumed to be immediately
recovered to the original performance level after a certain number
of time-steps
r ¼ rmax  r	 with r	 < rmax (13)
where rmax is an upper bound for number of time-steps for recov-
ery and r* is a reduction specific to the component. Since each
time-step has a length of Dt ¼ ðT=uÞ, the duration of the recovery
process is r  ðT=uÞ. This recovery model corresponds to a one-
step recovery profile; as discussed before in the context of failure
profiles, various characteristic profiles of recovery in time are pos-
sible as well, cf., Refs. [3] and [13].
In the context of our model, the simulation procedure is exe-
cuted consecutively for all time points, resulting in a single path
of the performance process t 7!QðtÞ over the time interval [0, T].
A sample average of the system performance as a function of time
T obtained from a Monte Carlo simulation is exemplarily illus-
trated in Fig. 4. The probabilistic resilience metric given in
Eq. (2) can, of course, also be computed as a suitable average of
Monte Carlo samples.
When analyzing the resilience of the system, an important task
consists in determining the set of all endowment configurations
(A; z) that lead to a prescribed acceptable level of system
resilience. The numerical procedure is computationally expensive,
but tractable due to the grid search algorithm by Feinstein et al.
[18]. In addition, the problem is also simplified if restrictions are
imposed on the matrix A via a suitable function gz, where z
denotes the vector of types; this was discussed in Sec. 2.3.
To illustrate this procedure in the context of a flow network
model, we fix the vector of types z 2 f1; 2g8 for the eight edges.
Figure 3 provides, for example, z ¼ ð2; 1; 2; 1; 2; 2; 1; 2Þ>. We
assume that the constraint function gz captures the following
restrictions: (a) recovery improvements r	i are fixed and equal for
all components i. (b) Capacities ci are a function of the type ji of
the components i, i.e., if two components are of the same type,
they possess the same capacity. We explore a range of capacities
in order to separate acceptable and inacceptable pairs. Figure 5
provides an example how the results of the grid search algorithm
could look like. The blue dots signify the acceptable pairs of
capacities of the two types of components, whereas red dots are
inacceptable pairs. Acceptable pairs satisfy the desired resilience
criterion, while inacceptable pairs do not. Obviously, the compu-
tation of the systemic risk measure significantly facilitates deci-
sion-making.
Additionally, the procedure allows the integration of monetary
aspects into any decision process that is focusing on the resilience
of the system. An important question concerns the identification
of a least expensive configuration that is acceptable with respect
to the chosen resilience criterion. If increasing the endowment
values is costly, a least expensive solution will always be at the
boundary between the red and the blue area. If the price of the
endowments is linearly increasing, prices define a normal vector
to this boundary that characterizes the least expensive acceptable
configurations on the boundary, as illustrated by the green points
in Fig. 5. Finding the least expensive configurations corresponds
to efficient allocation rules as introduced by Feinstein et al. [18].
4 Multistage High-Speed Axial Compressor
Gas turbines are a highly important technology employed in
industrial application, e.g., for electricity production, as well as in
the military and transportation sector, e.g., as component of air-
craft propulsion systems. In particular, axial compressors are one
of the key components of gas turbines. For economic and safety
reasons, it is of the utmost importance that they are as resilient as
possible. In order to illustrate how the decision-making method
developed in this paper allows for an analysis of the financial
Fig. 4 Monte Carlo sample average of the system performance
Q(t) for the flow network shown in Fig. 3, considering the fol-
lowing model and simulation parameter values: rmax 5 21 and
r 	i ¼ 11 for all edges; ci 5 12 for all edges of type ji 5 1; ci 5 8 for
all edges of type ji 5 2, b ¼ 0:025, u 5 100, and Dt ¼ 0:01
Fig. 5 Acceptable parameter pairs are marked as blue, filled
dots; least expensive acceptable pairs are marked as blue, filled
dots that are highlighted in green
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burden of increasing resilience and for an optimal choice between
different instruments to enhance resilience, our method is applied
to a functional model of an axial compressor.
4.1 Model. In a previous work by one of the authors of this
paper, developed within the Collaborative Research Centre 871,
funded by the German Research Foundation [38], a functional
model of an axial compressor was created as the foundation for a
reliability analysis. This model has been developed to represent
the reliability characteristic and functionality of the four-stage
high-speed axial compressor of the Institute for Turbomachinery
and Fluid Dynamics at Leibniz Universit€at Hannover. Detailed
information about this axial compressor is provided in Refs.
[39–41].
The model captures the influence of the roughness of the blades
in the individual stator and rotor rows, alternately connected in
series, on the performance of the axial compressor, namely, on the
total-to-total pressure ratio and on the total-to-total isentropic effi-
ciency. This functional model of the axial compressor has been
assembled by applying a sensitivity analysis and identifying the
relative important indices from an aerodynamic model of the com-
pressor. The network representing the functional model is shown
in Fig. 6. Each component of the reliability-based model repre-
sents one of the rotor blade rows (R1–R4) or stator blade rows
(S1–S4). The arrangement of the components was chosen accord-
ing to the effect of blade roughness on the two performance
parameters of the axial compressor. More specifically, an interrup-
tion between start and end means a performance variation of at
least 25%, corresponding to a nonfunctional compressor. This
defines the system performance Q(t) of the functional model for
the subsequent application of the resilience decision-making
method. The system performance is determined at each time point
th and is 1 if there is a connection from start to end and 0 if this
connection is interrupted. More detailed information on the func-
tional model and its formulation can be obtained from Ref. [38].
For the analysis, as components, we do not distinguish between
the stator blade rows and the rotor blade rows and enumerate
them by i 2 f1;…; 8g. Further, each of them is assigned to the
same component type, i.e., it is ji¼ 1 8i 2 f1;…; 8g, and we
therefore simplify the notation by ðai; jiÞ ¼ ðai; 1Þ ¼ ai
8i 2 f1;…; 8g. Each row, i.e., each component of the functional
model, is assumed to be characterized by two endowment proper-
ties, a roughness resistance re and a recovery improvement r*,
so that a component is fully described by ai ¼ ðrei; r	i Þ. Both
the roughness resistance rei and the recovery improvement r
	
i
of each row i are assumed to be functions of the type ji, i.e., rei
¼ rei0 ; r	i ¼ r	i0 if ji ¼ ji0 and are therefore in this case study equal
for all components. This restriction can be captured by a suitable
constraint function gz, cf., Sec. 2.3.
It should be noted that, in order to improve the roughness resist-
ance of a blade, techniques that counteract the roughening of the
surface are required. However, such techniques are not clearly
identifiable and readily available at the moment. Within the scope
of this example, the application of methodologies leading to an
improvement of the resistance, e.g., by applying coating techni-
ques, can nevertheless still be envisioned for the scope of the
analysis. As an example, in areas not inherent with the mechanical
resistance, the principle of blade coatings is already extensively
employed, e.g., in the reduction of heat transfer from the gas flow
into the blades by means of thermal coatings [42].
Each component of the functional model can fail at random
after the system performance has been computed at time th. A
failed component is treated as no longer present in the model and
does not contribute to the overall system performance at time thþ1
and all subsequent time points anymore until it is fully recovered.
The failure probability of a component i in the time interval
ðth; thþ1Þ is assumed to be constant in time, cf., Ref. [38], and is
given by
Pfcomponent i fails during ðth; thþ1Þg ¼ Dt  ki (14)
with
ki ¼ 0:8 0:03  rei (15)
where ki is the time-independent failure rate. An increase of the
roughness resistance of a row of blades will reduce the degrada-
tion of the surface, and thus, the corresponding failure rate ki. In
contrast to the flow model in Sec. 3, in the functional model of the
axial compressor, a component can fail exclusively at random.
If a component i failed, its functionality is assumed to be fully
recovered after a number of time-steps according to Eq. (13).
Single-step failure and recovery profiles are assumed in this appli-
cation (cf., Sec. 3).
4.2 Costs of Endowment Properties. The optimal endow-
ment properties are related to the quality of the components, and
an increase in their production quality is associated with large
costs. This should be taken in to account in the decision-making
process. As discussed in Ref. [43], an increase of the reliability of
components in complex networks might be associated with an
exponential increase in their costs, and in our analysis, we will
make such an assumption.
The endowment property “roughness resistance” affects the
failure rate of the blades of a row, cf., Eqs. (14) and (15). Better
“roughness resistance” improves reliability, and we assume that




pricere  1:3ðrei1Þ (16)
where rei is the “roughness resistance” value of component i and
pricere a common basic price that does not depend on i in this
case study. In a similar way, an exponential relationship is




price	  1:3ðr	i 1Þ (17)
The total cost “cost” of an endowment is the sum of these costs:
Fig. 6 Functional model of the multistage high-speed axial
compressor
Table 1 Parameter values for the resilience decision-making
method for the functional model of the multistage high-speed
axial compressor
Parameter Scenario
Number of rotor/stator blade rows l 8
Acceptance threshold a 0.8
Number of time-steps u 200
Length of a time-step Dt 0.05
Maximum recovery time rmax 21
Recovery improvement r* r	i 2 f1;…; 20g
Roughness resistance re rei 2 f1;…; 20g
Recovery improvement price price* 600e
Roughness resistance price pricere 500e
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cost ¼ costre þ cost	 (18)
4.3 Scenario. In order to apply the decision-making method
for resilience-enhancing endowments to the multistage high-speed
axial compressor, the model parameter and simulation parameter
values, shown in Table 1, are considered. A resilience acceptance
threshold of a ¼ 0:8, an arbitrarily selected number of u¼ 200
time-steps as well as an arbitrarily selected time-step length of
Dt ¼ 0:05 are assumed. We first determine the set of all accepta-
ble endowments corresponding to a resilience value of at least
Res ¼ 0:8 over the considered time period. Second, in practice,
any improvement of the axial compressor blades is associated
with costs; thus, the least expensive acceptable endowment is
characterized as well, denoted by Â. The roughness resistance re
and the recovery improvement r* are explored over
rei 2 f1;…; 20g and r	i 2 f1;…; 20g 8i 2 f1;…; lg. These val-
ues can be interpreted as increasing quality levels. In terms of
recovery, this leads to a recovery time for the components of max-
imum 20 time-steps to a minimum of one time-step, depending on
the recovery improvement value r	i of each component.
The scenario was simulated on the basis of the functional
model, following the procedure described in Secs. 2.3 and 2.4.
Figure 7 shows the results of the grid search algorithm. The blue,
filled dots are the acceptable pairs of roughness resistance and
recovery improvement. In terms of system resilience, the impact
of the quality of recovery improvement and the quality of the
blade coatings can be compared. For example, for recovery
improvement values of r	i  15 time-steps, only the minimum
roughness resistance value of rei¼ 1 is necessary in order to
achieve the desired level of system resilience.
By applying the grid search algorithm [18], only about 10% of
the possible pairs of roughness resistance and recovery improve-
ment values had to be tested to determine R(Y). As described in
Sec. 3, the least expensive endowment is an element of the bound-
ary of R(Y). Taking into account the base prices in Table 1, the
least expensive endowment is characterized by a roughness resist-
ance of rei¼ 8 and a recovery improvement of r	i ¼ 13 for each
component. In Fig. 7, the corresponding pair is highlighted in
green. According to Eq. (17), its cost is 136,930e.
5 Berlin’s U-Bahn and S-Bahn System
Berlin’s subway U-Bahn, suburban train S-Bahn, trams, and
buses carry more than 1.5 billion passengers each year. Approxi-
mately, two-thirds of these passengers are transported via the S-
Bahn and U-Bahn rails [44,45]. These are the most used public
transport systems in Berlin and of utmost importance for
Germany’s capital. Obviously, key infrastructures of high social
and economic relevance require a large degree of resilience. The
method developed in this paper will be applied to a model of the
Berlin subway and suburban train system, with the aim of examin-
ing suitable resilience-enhancing modifications. Our methodology
could also be applied to assess the resilience of new systems that
Fig. 7 Numerical results of the grid search algorithm for the
functional model of the axial compressor with explored rough-
ness resistance/recovery improvement values
Fig. 8 Topological network for the Berlin metro system
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are still in their design phase. This provides an opportunity to
characterize ex ante adequate system requirements in terms of
reliability, robustness, and regenerative capacity.
5.1 Model. The U-Bahn and S-Bahn public transportation
systems in Berlin are interconnected via multiple train stations.
As described in Ref. [37], they may thus be considered as one sin-
gle public transport network, in the following called “metro
network”. Zhang et al. [46] explain how a metro network can be
mapped into a topological graph: train stations correspond to the
nodes and the connecting railway lines to the edges of the graph.
For simplicity, we map parallel railway lines between two stations
to one single undirected edge. In this way, the complexity of the
metro network can be significantly reduced. In the case of the
Berlin metro network, this procedure leads to a topological graph
with 306 nodes and 350 edges. This representation of the U-Bahn
and S-Bahn system is shown in Fig. 8.
We begin our analysis with the definition of a suitable metric of
the system performance of the network, as explained in Sec. 2.3.
Zhang et al. [47] present resilience assessments for large-scale
metro networks and apply their approach to the Shanghai metro
network. They suggest that the connectivity between the individ-
ual stations is an essential criterion for assessing metro operations.
Their approach employs the characteristics of topographic net-
works in order to capture resilience, e.g., the characteristic path
length, the network-clustering coefficient, the average node
degree, and the network efficiency.
Network efficiency, as described by Latora and Marchiori [48],
is a quantitative indicator of the network connectivity:
Ef ¼
1






with N being the number of nodes in the network and dij being the
path length between node i and node j, i.e., the shortest distance
between these nodes. We use the network efficiency Ef as system
performance of the Berlin metro network in each time point th,
previously denoted by Q(th). Zhan and Noon [49] and Dreyfus
[50] provide a good overview of tools for efficiently determining
the path length dij between nodes, e.g., the algorithms of Floyd,
Dijkstra’s, or Bellman-Ford.
The node degree represents the number of nodes in the graph
that have a direct connection to the ith node. In many useful ran-
dom graphs, the distribution of node degrees follows a power dis-
tribution, see, e.g., Barabasi and Albert [51]. Figure 9 shows the
relative frequencies of the node degrees in case of the Berlin
metro network which could be approximated by a power
distribution.
Metro stations are modeled as nodes of the network. We
assume that each metro station i is characterized by two endow-
ment properties, (a) robustness roi and (b) recovery improvement
r	i ; a component i of type ji is described by a tuple
ðai; jiÞ ¼ ðroi; r	i ; jiÞ. Again, both endowment properties are
assumed to be functions of their component type ji only, such that
roi ¼ roi0 and r	i ¼ r	i0 if ji ¼ ji0 . These restrictions can again for-
mally be captured by the constraint function gz that explicitly
describes the reduction of the dimension of the problem, cf.,
Sec. 2.3.
Metro stations fail at random. The failure probability for each
component i is
Pfcomponent i fails during ðth; thþ1Þg ¼ Dt  kiðthÞ (20)
with




where kiðthÞ is the failure rate at time th, kiðthÞ is the time-
dependent number of direct neighbors of the ith metro station that
are in a failed state at time th, roi is the robustness of the ith metro
station, and romax is the maximum value of the robustness. As the
robustness of a metro station i increases, its failure rate kiðthÞ
decreases. In the event of failure of a directly adjacent metro sta-
tion, its probability of failure increases; a rational for this assump-
tion is that the load on the considered station becomes larger
which increases the likelihood of failure. This phenomenon might
potentially lead to cascading failures, cf., Refs. [52–54].
Fig. 9 Relative frequency of node degrees for the metro net-
work of Berlin
Table 2 Parameter values for two scenarios of the decision-making method of the Berlin metro network
Parameter Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Number of nodes l 306 306
Number of edges 350 350
Acceptance threshold a 0.8 0.8
Number of time-steps u 100 100
Length of a time-step Dt 0.01 0.01
Maximum recovery time rmax 25 25
Maximum robustness romax 20 20
Number of metro station types 2 1
Recovery improvement r* r	i ¼ 15 for ji 2 f1; 2g r	i 2 f1;…; 20g
Robustness ro roi 2 f1;…; 20g for ji 2 f1; 2g roi 2 f1;…; 20g
Robustness price priceroðroi;jiÞ price
ro





Recovery improvement price price	ðr	i ;jiÞ
price	ðr	i ;jiÞ
¼ 1100e for ji 2 f1; 2g price	r	i ¼ 1100e
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The second endowment property, the recovery improvement r	i ,
determines the time to recovery after failure according to Eq.
(13). Failed metro stations are not removed, but remain in the set
of metro stations; however, their node degree becomes 0 in the
evolving network structure. This assumption is important, since
the computation and interpretation of network efficiency Ef
depends on the number of nodes; our case study relies on the fact
that the number of nodes is preserved. After recovery, all previous
connections to other metro stations are restored, unless these are
in a state of failure. Our analysis focuses on determining the opti-
mal endowments in terms of resilience. This is in contrast to
Zhang et al. [47] whose focus is — among other things — the
optimal order in which connections should be recovered.
5.2 Endowment Property Costs. Improving the endowment
properties is costly. We again assume an exponential relationship.






where ji is the type of station i, its robustness is roi, and its basic
price of the endowment property “robustness” is priceroðroi;jiÞ. The





 1:2r	i 1 (23)
where ji is the type of station i, its recovery improvement is r
	
i ,
and its basic price of the endowment property “recovery
improvement” is price	ðr	i ;jiÞ
. The total cost costðA;zÞ of an endow-
ment (A; z) is obtained as
costðA;zÞ ¼ costro þ cost	 (24)
5.3 Scenarios. We consider two different scenarios character-
ized by the simulation and model parameters in Table 2. In both
scenarios, we assume a resilience threshold of a ¼ 0:8, a number
of u¼ 100 time-steps, and a time-step length of Dt ¼ 0:01. The
objective of the analysis is to characterize suitable endowment
allocations such that the metro network’s resilience is at least
Res¼ 0.8. We will also identify the least expensive acceptable
endowments, denoted by ðÂ; zÞ in both cases.
5.3.1 Scenario 1. In the first scenario, each metro station is
assigned to one of the two station types, namely, “small” and
“large.” The “small” metro stations i (type ji¼ 1) have only one or
two direct neighboring stations, i.e., a node degree of 1, 2, while
the “large” metro stations i (type ji¼ 2) have more than two direct
neighboring stations, i.e., a node degree> 2, and are highlighted
in red in Fig. 8. Out of all stations, a total of 245 are of type 1 and
61 of type 2.
The endowment properties of all components depend on their
type only. We vary robustness with roi 2 f1;…; 20g for all i. The
recovery improvements of both component types are fixed and
equal r	i ¼ 15 for all components i independent of their types.
Figure 10 shows the results of the grid search algorithm for sce-
nario 1. The blue, filled dots signify the pairs of robustness values
that lead to acceptable endowments. In terms of system resilience,
the robustness of the “small” metro stations is more important than
the one of the “large” stations in this case study. For example, with
large robustness values for the “small” stations, i.e., roi  18 for
ji¼ 1, acceptability may be achieved even with a minimal robust-
ness value of roi¼ 1 of “large” stations, i.e., ji¼ 2. The slope of the
almost linear boundary indicates that in order to compensate for the
reduction of one robustness unit of the endowments of the “small”
stations, an increase of approximately 1.7 robustness units of the
endowments of the “large” stations is necessary.
This observation can be explained as follows: first, the number
of “small” stations (245) is significantly larger than the number
of “large” stations (61), and thus, their overall influence is large.
Second, “small” stations are often arranged in chains. If a station
within such a chain fails, all stations further out of town are auto-
matically cut off from the main network, which has a major
impact on network efficiency.
Thanks to the grid search algorithm only about 10% of all pairs
of robustness values had to be tested to determine the set of all
accepted endowments. As described in Sec. 3, the least expensive
endowment is an element of the boundary of the acceptable
endowment allocations. For the parameters in Table 2, the least
expensive endowment corresponds to a robustness of roi¼ 10 for
all “small” stations i of type ji¼ 1 and a robustness of roi¼ 13 for
all “large” stations of type ji¼ 2. The corresponding pair of
parameters is highlighted in green in Fig. 10. The total endow-
ment cost, computed according to Eq. (24), equals 6,673,579e.
5.3.2 Scenario 2. In the second scenario, all metro stations
are assigned to the same station type, and ðai; jiÞ can simply be
written as ai. We vary both recovery improvement and robustness,
i.e., r	i ; roi 2 f1;…; 20g 8i.
Figure 11 shows the results of the grid search algorithm for sce-
nario 2. The blue, filled dots signify the pairs of robustness and
recovery improvement values that lead to acceptable endowments.
The application of the grid search algorithm leads to a similar
reduction of the computing effort as in scenario 1. For the
Fig. 10 Numerical results of scenario 1 of the Berlin metro net-
work, varying robustness
Fig. 11 Numerical results of scenario 2 of the Berlin metro net-
work, varying robustness/recovery-improvement
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parameters in Table 2, the least expensive endowment corre-
sponds to robustness roi¼ 14 and recovery improvement r	i ¼ 11
for all stations i; this is highlighted in green in Fig. 11. Its cost is
computed according to Eq. (24) and equals 6,995,127e.
6 Conclusion
This paper introduces a procedure for decision-making in com-
plex systems that enables the optimal allocation of scarce resour-
ces to resilience-enhancing endowments. The methodology
integrates systemic risk measures with time-dependent and proba-
bilistic resilience metrics. Our approach is not limited to controls
of the same type, but allows for a direct comparison of the impact
of heterogeneous controls on the resilience of the system, e.g.,
failure prevention and recovery improvement arrangements, over
any period of time. The system behavior itself may depend on a
wide variety of stochastic variables that influence its performance.
Our method characterizes, in a first step, all acceptable endow-
ments of system components that lead to a desired level of resil-
ience. In a second step, it is capable of incorporating monetary
aspects into the decision-making process and admits the identifi-
cation of the least expensive controls. In addition, we explain a
grid search algorithm for systemic risk measures that significantly
reduces the required computational effort.
The suggested methodology is not limited to a certain type of
networks. This paper illustrates that the approach is easily adapta-
ble and universally applicable. Examples in this paper include
technical systems such as axial compressors as well as infrastruc-
ture networks such as the Berlin metro system. Many other appli-
cations are possible, thereby supporting decision-makers in
improving the complex systems of our modern society and
increasing their resilience.
Future research may apply the suggested methodology to highly
complex systems. In this paper, many simplifying assumptions
were made in order to be able to focus on the basic concepts and
to demonstrate the versatility of the approach in concrete exam-
ples. More challenging problems, e.g., higher dimensions of the
parameter space, are left to future developments. From a concep-
tional point of view, real-world problems involve multiple objec-
tives and are not limited to a finite time horizon. Future work
should not only focus on system resilience and the costs of the
controls but also on long-term effects, such as different expected
profits under a modified system resilience. Comprehensive deci-
sions require a deep understanding of the tradeoff between the
costs and the gains of resilience. Further work will also have to
address the balancing between monetary and safety-related crite-
ria for decision-making. The proposed method provides powerful
instruments for one important aspect: the characterization of
acceptable resilience-enhancing endowments and the identifica-
tion of the most cost-efficient allocation. This tool box will be a
prerequisite for future answers to many challenging questions.
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